

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION**

<b>ROBERT SOLIS,</b>	)	
<b>ID # 13003799,</b>	)	
<b>Plaintiff,</b>	)	
<b>vs.</b>	)	<b>No. 3:13-CV-0983-K-BH</b>
	)	
<b>DALLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,</b>	)	
<b>et. al,</b>	)	
<b>Defendants.</b>	)	<b>Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge</b>

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION**

Pursuant to *Special Order 3-251*, this case has been automatically referred for pretrial management. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the complaint should be **DISMISSED** as frivolous.

**I. BACKGROUND**

The plaintiff, an inmate in the Dallas County Jail, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department and its employee, Sergeant Weeks, for violating his civil rights. He claims that Sergeant Weeks has repeatedly made sexual comments about the plaintiff’s girlfriend or wife/mother of his child while walking the plaintiff to visits with her. (Compl. at 3-4). The plaintiff seeks to be protected “from the county” and to be assured that his family will not have to face Sergeant Weeks during visits. (*Id.* at 4).

**II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING**

The plaintiff is an inmate of the Dallas County jail who has been permitted to proceed *in forma pauperis*. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *See Martin v. Scott*, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding *in forma pauperis*, his complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b) provide for *sua sponte* dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” *Id.* at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

### **III. SECTION 1983**

The plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States” and “afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms.” *Livadas v. Bradshaw*, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See *Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); *Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp.*, 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

#### **A. Non-Jural Entity**

The plaintiff names the Dallas Sheriff’s Department as a defendant. (Compl. at 1, 3). A plaintiff may not bring a civil rights action against a servient political agency or department unless such agency or department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. *Darby v. Pasadena Police*

*Dep't*, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). In *Darby*, the Fifth Circuit held that “unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government itself.” *Id.* at 313. A county sheriff’s department is not a jural entity subject to suit. See *Magnett v. Dallas County Sheriff’s Dep’t*, No. 3:96-CV-3191, 1998 WL 51355, at \*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998). The claims against the Dallas Sheriff’s Department should therefore be dismissed.

#### **B. Sexual Misconduct**

The plaintiff also sues Sergeant Weeks for “sexual misconduct” by making sexual comments about plaintiff’s girlfriend or wife on several occasions. The plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 1983 only where he demonstrates that he has been deprived of a constitutional right. He has not done so. There is no constitutional right to be free from either verbal abuse or slander against his girlfriend or wife. *Moore v. Collins*, 2010 WL 5014332, \*4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2010), citing *Calhoun v. Hargrove*, 312 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2002). The claims against Weeks should therefore also be dismissed.

### **IV. RECOMMENDATION**

The plaintiff’s complaint should be **DISMISSED** with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This dismissal will count as a “strike” or “prior occasion” within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Section 1915(g), which is commonly known as the “three-strikes” provision, provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section, if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

**SIGNED this 19th day of March, 2013.**

  
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

  
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE